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Primary Causality and ibdii' (creare) in the Liber de causis 
RICHARD C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee/WI) 
The Liber de causis ( LDC), a short metaphysical treatise translated into Latin in 
the Twelfth century in all likelihood by the famous Gerard of Cremona at Tole-
do, exercised a powerful influence in the thinking of European theologians and 
philosophers of the High Middle Ages and beyond, something easily evidenced 
in the large number of extant Latin manuscripts (over 250) and commentaries as 
well as the many references made to this work. 1 Its early importance to 
metaphysical thinking on God and creation among the Latins led to its becoming 
required reading for all who wished to understand the thought of Aristotle to 
whom the Latin tradition attributed the text until Thomas Aquinas made known 
its dependence on the Elements of Theology of Prod us. 2 While evidence of this 
work in the Arabic tradition is very modest with only three manuscripts known 
to be extant and no direct citations of it in what we have of the writings of the 
most well known philosophers of the Classical tradition - al-Kindi, al-Farabi, 
Avicenna, Averroes -, it has recently been argued that the Liber de causis 
importantly and decisively influenced metaphysical thinking in the early forma-
tion of philosophy in the Islamic milieu from Greek sources in the era of al-
Kindi.3 If this view is able to withstand critical scrutiny, the importance of the 
Liber de causis for the Arabic tradition from the Ninth century and for the Latin 
Tradition from the Twelfth century would earn that little work very special 
1 For a thorough account of the status quaestionis of the texts of this work in Latin and 
Arabic, of its sources, of secondary literature and more, see Cristina D ' Ancona and Richard C. 
Taylor, ,Le Liber de causis",in: Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Supplement, ed. Richard 
Goulet et al. Paris 2003, 599-647. 
2 Ibid., 604-5. 
3 Cristina D'Ancona, ,The Origins of Islamic Philosophy", in: The Cambridge History of 
Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lioyd Gerson, Cambridge 2010, Vol. 2, 869-893, 1170-1178. 
In particular, see 879 where the author identifies a citation of a certain kitiib al- 'ulal mentioned 
in Arabic version of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Qu. 2.19, as ,nothing else than the pseudo-
Aristotelian Liber de causis of the Latin Middle Ages." For this the author draws on the work 
of Silvia Fazzo and Hillary Wiesner in ,Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Kindi Circle and in al-
Kindi's Cosmology", in: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 3 (1 992) 119-153, in particular 152 sqq. 
where the authors translate the Arabic text from MS Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kiitiiphanesi, 
Carullah 1279, 63v-64r. On 139 they write, ,Such a reference tied to such a Proclan concept 
encourages the hope that this might be the earliest appearance of the Liber de causis, appearing 
anomalously by the name under which it travelled to the west. The phrase does not exactly 
match any in the Liber de causis, although the terminology and the notion are at home in it." 
The difficulty is that the LDC in Arabic is not called kitiib al- 'ulal in its title or in any citations 
in the Arabic tradition. Prof. D' Ancona was generous enough to share with me her discussion 
of this issue in ,Nota sulla traduzione latina del Libra di Aristotele sull'esposizione del bene puro 
e sui titolo Liber de Causis", forthcoming in a Festschrift for Gianfranco Fioravanti. 
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prominence as an invaluable key to unpacking metaphysical accounts of creation 
by philosophers of the Arabic tradition and theologians and philosophers of the 
Latin tradition. Yet if that is so, then the honor must be shared to some extent 
with the Neoplatonist Proclus. 
The Liber de causis consists of quotations, paraphrases, interpretations, and 
additions to texts extracted from the work of Proclus and also bears clear 
evidence of the influence of Plotiniana Arabica (PA) texts derived from the 
Enneads by the founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus. 4 The works of those two 
thinkers are more commonly considered not to promote a doctrine of creation 
but rather something different, a teaching of a necessary emanation of reality 
from the One which overflows insofar as it is also the Good. For example, in the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, four characteristics of Neoplatonic emana-
tion in contrast to creation are listed by W. Hasker, the last of which is, ,The 
emanation of a lower level from a higher is eternal and necessary; it follows from 
the nature of the higher level, and does not involve or depend on a decision of 
will. "5 In contrast, creation is joined with religious teachings and described by 
Hasker as, ,The doctrine of the creation of the universe by God is common to 
the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; reflection on crea-
tion has been most extensively developed within the Christian tradition. Creati-
on is by a single supreme God, not a group of deities, and is an ,absolute' creati-
on (creation ex nihilo, ,out of nothing') rather than being either a ,making' out of 
previously existing material or an ,emanation' (outflow) from God's own nature. 
Creation, furthermore, is a free act on God's part; he has no ,need' to create but 
has done so out of love and generosity. He not only created the universe ,in the 
4 The PA draws on Plotinus, Enneads IV-VI but does so within an interpretive framework 
much influenced by Aristotelian thought itself influenced by the later Neoplatonic tradition. 
The texts of the PA include (i) The Theology of Aristotle, ed. 'Abdulrrahman Badawi in Plotinus 
apud arabes/ljlii(fn 'inda '/-'arab, Cairo, 1955, and translated into English by Geoffrey Lewis in 
Plotini opera II, Paris/Bruxelles 1959, on the basis of Lewis's unpublished edition and translati-
on his in: A Re-examination of the so-called, Theology of Aristotle', D. Phil., Oxford University 
1950; (ii) The Treatise on Divine Knowledge, ed. Paul Kraus published by Georg C. Anawati, 
O.P., in: ,Le Neoplatonisme dans la pensee musulmane: etat actuel des recherche", in: Acta 
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 198 (1974), 339-405; translations available in Plotini 
opera II; Arabic text also published by Badawi in: Plotinus apud arabes, 165-183; (iii) The 
Sayings of the Greek Wiseman, in: Lewis, Re-examination, for which Oxford Bodleian Marsh 
MS 539 was used; translations in: Plotini opera II; a portion of the Arabic texts are published 
by Badawi in: Plotinus apud arabes, 395-99. For further information on the PA, see Peter 
Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus. A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle, London 2002; 
and Maroun Aouad, ,La Theologie d' Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus arabus", in: 
Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet, Paris 1989, Vol. I, 541-90. 
5 William Hasker, ,Creation and conservation, religious doctrine of", in: Edward Craig 
(Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London 1998, Retrieved August 19, 2011 , from 
http:/ / 0-www.rep.routledge.com.libus.csd. m u.edu/ article/KG 12SECT3 
116 
Primary Causality and ibdii' ( creare) in the Liber de causis 
beginning' , but he sustains (,conserves') it by his power at each moment of its 
existence; without God's support it would instantly collapse into nothingness."6 
Let us call this notion creation 1 or Abrahamic creation and stipulate that it 
involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than 
itself by bringing forth all ex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness in 
an action somehow including freedom, will and choice such that there is neither 
external nor internal necessity compelling creation 1• In this the primary cause 
acts with freedom and in no way whatsoever needs to originate things, nor was it 
required to originate them by its intrinsic nature or formal constitution. 
In its Latin translation the LDC is clearly understood by the translator and 
the subsequent Latin tradition as a creationist account of some kind. In chapter 3 
the First Cause is said to create the being of soul through the mediation of 
intelligence (causa prima creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia). 7 In chapter 4, 
being (esse) is described as the first of created things (prima rerum creatarum) 
and to be after (post causam primam) but near to the First Cause which is 
described as pure being and one. Created being is identified with the intelligence 
in chapter 4 and as the first created thing created by the First Cause (primum 
creatum quod creatum est a causa prima) in 6/ some Latin manuscripts 7. 8 In 
15/16 first created being (ens creatum primum) is again intelligence and is called 
created and second being (ens secundum creatum) in relation to the First 
Creating Being (ens primum creans). In 8/9 - which is not dependent on Prod us 
but rather Plotinus in the Plotinana Arabica - the Latin has the First Cause 
creating all things ( creans omnes res) but again creating the intelligence without 
mediation and soul and nature through the mediation of the intelligence ( creans 
intelligentiam absque media et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res, mediante 
intelligentia). In 14/15 first created being as intelligence is infinite but First 
Creating Being is the first pure infinite (ens autem primum creans est infinitum 
primum purum) and even above infinity (ens primum creans est supra infinitum). 
In 17/18 the First Being is motionless and the cause of causes (ens primum est 
quietum et est causa causarum) giving being to all things ( dat omnibus rebus ens) 
through the mode of creation (per modum creationis), while others such as 
intelligence give to things not through the mode of creation but through the 
mode of form (non per modum creation is immo per modum formae). In 19/20 the 
6 Ibid. 
7 For the Latin text of the LDC I and elsewhere in this article follow the edition of Ad-
rian Pattin, ,Le Liber de causis. Edition etablie a l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et 
notes", in: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966) 90-203, as corrected in Richard C. Taylor, 
,Remarks on the Latin Text and the Translator of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair/ Liber de causis", 
in: Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 31 (1989) , 75-102. This revised text is printed in Albertus 
Magnus, De causis et processu univ ersitatis a prima causa, ed. Winfried Fauser, Cologne 1995 
[Opera omnia 17, 2] . 
8 In some Latin manuscripts the text of 4 is split into 4/ 5 with the result that the Latin 
manuscripts of the LDC have totals of 31 or 32 chapters or propositions with explication. The 
extant Arabic versions have just 31. 
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First Cause governs things without mixing with them (res creatas omnes praeter 
quod commisceatur cum eis) and emanates on them the power of life and 
goodnesses ( injluit super eas virtutem vitae et bonitates). In 21/22 what is merely 
self-sufficient is not able to create another thing (non potest creare aliquid aliud), 
while the First Cause is above the complete and perfect and creates things and 
emanates goodnesses ( creans reset injluens bonitates). In 22/23 God governs (re-
gens [ ... ] est deus) as the Creator of the intelligence, the first created (primum 
creatum), governs all through the governance of the intelligence (res, quae 
recipiunt regimen intelligentiae, recipiunt regimen creatoris intelligentiae). In 23/24 
the First Cause is in things as the First Creating Cause ( causam primam 
creantem). In 28/29 simple self-subsistent substances are said to be created 
without time ( creata sine tempore), while others are created in time ( creata in 
tempore) and still others are between these as sempiternal substances with time 
(substantiae sempiternae cum tempore). And, finally, at the end of the final chap-
ter, 31/32, all unity after the true one is said to be acquired and created ( omnis 
unitas post unum verum est acquisita, creata), while the Pure True One is the 
Creator of unitities, causing them to be acquired but not itself an acquired unity 
(unum verum purum est creans unitates, faciens acquirere, non acquisitum). There 
the Pure Entity (ens purum) is also the cause of generated temporal things and of 
all things eternal. While the first chapter explained the dependence of all on the 
primary cause, the last chapter establishes the existence of one primary cause 
through this argument from unity. 
The purpose of this brief study is to advance some precisions regarding the 
nature of divine causality as discussed in the original Arabic text of the LDC9 
and to provide some clarifications regarding the meanings of creation in this 
work. The need for this is prompted by several important considerations of 
which I now note just two. First, in the account of Hasker quoted above, emana-
tion as necessary and the absence of decision willed and free are listed as 
characteristics separating emanation from creation,. Yet in the Arabic LDC the 
language of emanation is present and directly connected with abda'a ( creare) on 
the part of al-mubdi' (the Creator). What is more, no discussion of will, choice 
or decision is found in the Arabic LDC. Second, as mentioned earlier, the p ri-
mary source of most of the reasoning of the LDC is derived from selected pro-
positions of the Elements of Theology of the Neoplatonist Proclus, while the pre-
sence of the thought of Plotinus can be detected directly in chapter 8 (Latin 8/ 9) 
9 My concern here is with the traditional version of the LDC known in Arabic as either 
, The Discourse on the Pure Good" (Kalam fz mal}t;i al-khair) or ,The Book of Aristotle's 
Expostion on the Pure Good" (Kitab al-zt;liil} li-Aris(Ufiills fz al-khair al-mal}(l} . The so-called 
,De causis II' is not considered here. Regarding that text, see Pierre Thillet and Saleh 
Oudaimah, , Proclus Arabe. In nouveau Liber de causis?", in: Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales [Ins-
titut fran~ais d'Etudes arabes de Damas] 53-54 (2001-2) 293-368. Also see the recent study of 
al-'AmirT by Elvira Wakelnig, Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al- 'Amirls Kitab al-Fu~iil fT l-Ma'alim al-
ilahTya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption, Leiden/Boston, 2006. 
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and indirectly elsewhere, albeit as this thought is found in the PA. But 
Neoplatonic philosophical thought is distinctly cited by Hasker as indicative of a 
rejection of creation1• In light of these considerations, the vocabulary chosen by 
the Latin translator, and the extensive use of the LDC as a creationist work by 
thinkers of the subsequent Latin tradition, it is clear there is a need for study of 
this work and the meaning of its vocabulary and philosophical assertions in its 
Arabic context for the determination of the larger considerations both of 
whether, pace Hasker, emanationism and creation in this work are in fact 
compatible under some definition of creation and of whether the author of the 
LDC may have intended to assert that compatibility. 
In what follows here I first provide an account of chapter 1 of the Arabic 
LDC and Proclus on primary and secondary causality. Second, I consider the 
pseudonymous author's account of agency using the Arabic fi'l (act, actus) and 
related forms from its triliteral root f '-l together with his account of abda'a and 
various forms of the triliteral root b-d-' which were translated into Latin as 
creator, creatio, creare, creans, creatum and related forms. Here I argue that the 
LDC has in fact a notion of creation, but one that is distinct from that of the 
Abrahamic traditions. Third, I consider a chapter of the LDC which seems to 
indicate that the author of the LDC made no such distinction. Finally, I 
conclude with a summary of what has been accomplished and remarks on the 
author's apparent conflation of the philosophical notion of ibdii' and the 
religious notion of creation1 in the context of the project of introducing 
philosophical principles and reasoning developed from Proclus and Plotinus into 
the cultural and developing scientific context of Islam in Ninth century 
Baghdad. 
1. Primary and Secondary Causality 
The Elements of Theology of the Fifth century Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus is 
the source on which the Arabic LDC draws for its account of primary and 
secondary causality prominent in its opening chapter. It is precisely in Proposi-
tions 56 and 57 that Proclus argues for the intrinsic causal presence of the 
transcendent One or Good in all that is below it, even to the point of asserting 
that privation of form is from the Good. 10 The transcendence of the One and 
the multiple levels of hierarchical intermediate realities set forth by Proclus 
would seem necessarily to indicate a distance so great that the involvement of 
the One becomes less and less at the lower levels of what proceeds from the One 
to the point of being absent or nearly so at the lowest level. Instead, argues Pro-
clus, in the case of any effect, insofar as the very being of a secondary cause in 
10 Prod us, Elements of Theology, ed. & tr. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, Prop. 57, 56.15-16. 




the emanative hierarchy is owed to a prior cause, it owes to the prior cause also 
all that it produces by the power of production that it has arising from its own 
being or existence. 
PROP. 56: , All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure 
produced from those prior and more determinative principles from which the 
secondary were themselves derived. 
For if the secondary has its whole existence from its prior, thence also it receives 
its power of further production, since productive powers reside in producers in 
virtue of their existence and form part of their being. But if it owes to the supe-
rior cause its power of production, to that superior it owes its character as a 
cause in so far as it is a cause, a character meted out to it from thence in propor-
tion to its constitutive capacity. If so, the things which proceed from it are 
caused in virtue of its prior; for the same principle which makes the one a cause 
makes the other an effect. If so, the effect owes to the superior cause its charac-
ter as an effect. 
Again, it is evident that the effect is determined by the superior principle in a 
greater measure. For if the latter has conferred on the secondary being the 
causality which enabled it to produce, it must itself have possessed this causality 
primitively (prop. 18), and it is in virtue of this that the secondary being genera-
tes, having derived from its prior the capacity of secondary generation. But if the 
secondary is productive by participation, the primal primitively and by commu-
nication, the latter is causative in a greater measure, inasmuch as it has 
communicated to another the power of generating consequents." 11 
Here Proclus responds to the concern of the distance of the One from the 
lowest of effects with the principle that the totality of what any secondary (or 
tertiary or later) cause is or has must be recognized as due to the primary cause, 
that is, not only the being of the secondary or later cause but also its very power 
to be productive of anything else or to carry out any activity must be traced to 
the primary cause. As a consequence, the primary cause, seemingly more causally 
distant, in fact is more causally present (,the effect owes to the superior cause its 
character as an effect") insofar as no secondary or later cause can exist or act of 
itself without reference to the primary cause which makes it a reality. 
Then he completes the account of principles of primary and secondary 
causality in Proposition 57 stressing the priority of the primary cause as cause of 
the secondary and necessarily cooperative in the action of the secondary. The 
primary cause, then, is primary because it had within its very self already the p o-
wer to bring about the secondary and all that the secondary causes and because it 
is the causal origin of- or simply cause of- the secondary cause's existence and 
power to be causally efficacious in reference to some third thing in the hierarchy. 
11 Proclus, ET 1963, 55. 
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PROP. 57: ,Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a 
greater number of posterior terms. 
For if it is a cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than its consequent 
(prop. 7). And if so, it must cause a greater number of effects: for greater power 
produces more effects, equal power, equal effects, and lesser power, fewer; and 
the power which can produce the greater effects upon a like subject can produce 
also the lesser, whereas a power capable of the lesser will not necessarily be 
capable of the greater. If, then, the cause is more powerful than its consequent, it 
is productive of a greater number of effects. 
But again, the powers which are in the consequent are present in a greater 
measure in the cause. For all that is produced by secondary beings is produced in 
a greater measure by prior and more determinative principles (prop. 56). The 
cause, then, is cooperative in the production of all that the consequent is capable 
of producing. 
And if it first produces the consequent itself, it is of course plain that it is opera-
tive before the latter in the activity which produces it. Thus every cause operates 
both prior to its consequent and in conjunction with it, and likewise gives rise to 
further effects posterior to it [ ... J." 12 
What is involved here in Proclus is a metaphysical hierarchy of productive 
per se causes, not a series of causes such as the production of a child by a parent 
with those parents caused or produced by their parents, and so forth. In the 
metaphysical hierarchy discussed here the activity of the lowest requires the 
actual and continuous presence of the causal activity of all those causes prior in 
the hierarchy all the way to the first cause in the hierarchy. Note that were the 
involvement of any one of those causes in the hierarchy to be absent, both the 
existence and the causal efficacy of everything below that missing link would fail. 
However, that is not to say that in the sequential production of A, B, and C, we-
re B to be removed, A would not have the power to produce C. Proclus reasons 
that, if A has sufficient power to produce in existence B and the power belonging 
to B enabling it to produce C, then A has sufficient power to produce C in the 
absence of B. That is, in principle the power to produce C has to be conceded to 
be present in A. 13 In that way A is the primary cause in the series ABC in a way 
12 Proclus, ET 1963, 55-57. I omit the last portion of the text which Dodds rightly 
indicates to be a corollary applying the principles to Soul and Intelligence. The LDC does not 
draw on the corollary. 
13 This proposition contains the principles of primary causality. However, in practice in 
the graduated course of the hierarchy the lower is weaker and has more plurality than the hig-
her. Consequently, when this is applied to the hierarchy of beings in the LDC the First Cause 
must first originate or cause only the first effect, the Intellect - which is the first originated 
being- and only through mediation of Intellect does it originate other things. Hence, in the 
LDC the First Cause is the sole originator of things and sole giver of being to things, but it 
cannot do so for other things below Intellect without the mediation of Intellect and other hig-
her realities such as Soul and Nature, as mentioned in LDC chapter 8 which is discussed below. 
That is, while A has the power to originate C, it can do so only through B. Hence, while the 
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that is not open to B or any other number of intermediaries between A and C. 
In Proposition 70 Prod us makes it clear that this analysis applies not only to the 
causation of distinct things but also to the causation of the intrinsic constituents 
of any thing. 
PROP. 70: , All those more universal characters which inhere in the originative 
principles both irradiate their participants before the specific characters and are 
slower to withdraw from a being which has once shared in them. 
For the higher cause begins its operation upon secondary beings before its 
consequent, and is present concomitantly with the presence of the latter, and is 
still present and operative when the consequent has ceased to operate; and this is 
true not only in respect of the range of objects affected (prop. 57) but in regard 
to each several contingent participant. Thus, for example, a thing must exist 
before it has life, and have life before it is human. And again, when the logical 
faculty has failed it is no longer human, but it is still a living thing, since it 
breathes and feels; and when life in turn has abandoned it existence remains to it, 
for even when it ceases to live it still has being. So in every case. The reason is 
that the higher cause, being more efficacious (prop. 56), operates sooner upon 
the participant (for where the same thing is affected by two causes it is affected 
first by the more powerful); and in the activity of the secondary the higher is co-
operative, because all the effects of the secondary are concomitantly generated 
by the more determinative cause; and where the former has withdrawn the latter 
is still present (for the gift of the more powerful principle is slower to abandon 
the participant, being more efficacious, and also inasmuch as through the gift of 
its consequent it has made its own irradiation stronger)." 14 
According to the example in the text of Proclus, this does not mean that 
human life can be produced without the presence of both being and living, but 
rather only that the formal characteristic of being is required for the presence of 
life and that the withdrawal of the formal characteristic of life would not entail 
the withdrawal of being. However, the withdrawal of being would entail the 
withdrawal of the posterior formal characteristic of life since being is caused first 
in the thing by the primary cause. The editor and translator of the Elements of 
Theology by Proclus, E. R. Dodds, indicates this with his parenthetical references 
to earlier propositions and thereby shows how Proclus intends to draw upon 
those to establish here that the very condition of existence that makes all other 
characteristics possible must be traced back to the primary cause alone. The pri-
mary cause is the only causal principle that can provide the condition of 
existence required for the effect (the third) and also the complete constitution of 
the secondary cause. 
LDC argues that the First Cause is the sole originator, it does not argue that it is the sole cause 
of the plurality of entities in the hierarchy and of the plurality of individuals within any species. 
14 Proclus, ET 1963, 66-67. 
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For Proclus the purpose of these propositions was to draw attention to the 
need to think the causal presence of the One in each and every thing posterior to 
it. Again, to emphasize the key point in this account of primary and secondary 
causality, in the analysis of any effect in a hierarchy of three or more, the activity 
of the second upon the third is based on the being and the power of causal 
activity belonging to the second. But the second (as well as the third and any 
subsequent others) is ontologically dependent in every way upon the causal 
activity of the first. That is, in addition to the existence of the second owed to 
the first, the very being of the power of activity on the part of the second to 
bring about the third or anything in it is owed in an ontologically prior way to 
the first, the primary cause. 
The author of the Arabic LDC brought together these three propositions 
from Proclus to form in his own way a basic account of primary and secondary 
causality in the first chapter of this work which sets the theme of the entire 
work, though it does so in terms of the principles functioning in the 
metaphysical doctrine of primary causality and without a single mention in the 
first chapter of the LDC of the vocabulary of abda'a (creare). 
Chapter <1 > 
,Every primary cause emanates more abundantly on its effect than does the uni-
versal second cause. And when the universal second cause removes its power 
from the thing, the universal first cause does not remove its power from it. For 
the universal first cause acts on the effect of the second cause before the univer-
sal second cause which is immediately adjacent to (the effect) acts on (the 
effect). So when the second cause which is immediately adjacent to the effect 
acts, its act is not able to do without the first cause which is above (the second 
cause). And when the second (cause) separates itself from the effect which is 
immediately adjacent to it, the first cause which is above (the second cause) does 
not separate itself from (the effect), because it is cause of (the effect's) cause. 
The first cause, therefore, is more the cause of the thing than its proximate cause 
which is immediately adjacent to (the thing). 
As examples of that we give being, living and man, for the thing must first 
be a being, then living, then a man. Thus, living is the proximate cause of the 
man and being is his remote cause. Being, then, is more a cause of the man than 
living because (being) is a cause of living which is a cause of the man. Likewise, 
when you make rationality a cause of the man, being is more a cause of the man 
than rationality because (being) is a cause of (rationality's) cause. The proof is 
that, when you remove the rational faculty from the man, it does not continue a 
man but it does continue living, breathing and sensitive. And when you remove 
living from it, it does not continue living but it does continue being, because 
being is not removed from it when living is removed. Because the cause is not 
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removed with the removal of its effect, the man 15 continues being. When the in-
dividual is not a man, it is an animal; and when it is not an animal, it is only a 
being. 
So it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more 
encompassing and more a cause of the thing than its proximate cause. On 
account of that, its act has come to be more strongly adherent to the thing than 
the act of (the thing's) proximate cause. This came to be so only because the 
thing is first acted on by the remote power, then secondly it is acted on by the 
power which is below the first. <Moreover>, the first cause aids the second 
cause in its act because every act which the second cause effects, the first cause 
also effects, except that (the first cause) effects it in another, transcendent and 
more sublime manner. And when the second cause separates itself from its 
effect, the first cause does not separate itself from it because the act of the first 
cause is mightier and more strongly adherent to the thing than the act of its 
proximate cause. Furthermore, the effect of the second cause has been made 
stable only through the power of the first cause. For, when the second cause ef-
fects a thing, the first cause which is above (the second cause) emanates on that 
thing from its power so that it strongly adheres to that thing and conserves it. 
Thus, it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more a cause 
of the thing than its proximate cause which is immediately adjacent to (the 
thing) and that it emanates its power on it and conserves it and does not separate 
itself from it with the separation of its proximate cause, but rather it remains in 
it and strongly adheres to it in accordance with what we have made clear and evi-
dent. "16 
The opening proposition of the LDC, then, consists in a restatement of the 
accounts of primary and secondary causality found in propositions 56, 57 and 70 
of the Elements of Theology by Proclus. Applied to caused entities of the world 
this doctrine asserts simply that in the reality of any caused thing in a hierarchy 
of per se causes the first cause is present and more causally efficacious with 
regard to any effect than is any intermediate cause. That doctrine is also applied 
here with regard to the intrinsic constituents of any caused items as well, since 
rationality is only possible in what is living and living is only possible in what 
exists. The very existence that is causally traced solely to the primary cause is a 
necessary prerequisite in the constitution of living existence and rational 
15 Proclus is more precise here by not specifying man as the subject after the removal of 
rationality than is the author of the LDC since the latter speaks of the man from whom 
rationality and other essential characteristics of what it is to be a man have been removed. 
16 This and other translations of the Arabic LDC in this article are substantially revised 
versions of that found in my edition and study of the Arabic LDC in Richard C. Taylor, The 
Liber de causis (Kalam fi mat:u;l al-khair): A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism, Doctoral Disser-
tation, University of Toronto 1981. I also draw on some of the analyses of philosophical 
vocabulary in that work, though the interpretation presented in this article is distinctively dif-
ferent. I provide the referents of pronouns in parentheses in the translation. 
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existence. The nature of this causal dependence later in the LDC is expressed in 
terms of emanation, something hardly surprising given its Neoplatonic source. 
Its expression is also framed with the terminology of agency with the 
employment of the Arabic rootf-'-1 as act (fi'l), effect (maful), to act (fa'ala in-
transitive), to act on (fa'ala fz), to effect or bring about (fa'ala transitive), and 
the passive to be acted on by (infa'ala min). What is more, in this context being 
(al-annryah, esse) is not specified as itself a thing, a form or even an act in its own 
right; rather, it is only a term used to denominate the consequence of an act 
caused by the primary cause, an act which is also a necessary condition for 
anything to exist, namely, that it has been caused by the primary cause in a 
hierarchy of causes. In this first chapter of the LDC the term annryah for 
,being' or ,existence' is not a technical term nor is it associated with any 
distinction of essence and existence because the author's purpose here is only to 
spell out in detail the nature of the doctrine of primary causality. Since the term 
is used to indicate dependence on a primary cause, one could as easily have used 
the term ,actuality' to say that the actuality of any second or later cause, 
including the actuality of its powers, in a hierarchy of primary causality depends 
on one first cause. 17 And, again, in this first proposition none of the vocabulary 
of abda 'a (ere are) is found. 
The account in Liber de causis chapter 1, then, is purely one of primary and 
secondary causality with its focus on the explanation of the presence in every 
effect of the causality of the primary cause in any causal hierarchy that begins 
with a single productive primary cause. (The proof that there is one primary 
cause as ,the First True One" is found in the closing chapter of the LDC which 
provides the argumentative validation of the account of primary causality 
explicated in the opening chapter.) Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
doctrine of primary causality expressed here is one to which many philosophers 
ascribe in general import, among them Plotinus, Proclus, the author of the LDC, 
al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, and many other philosophical and theological 
thinkers of the Greek, Arabic and Latin traditions. Nothing in reality escapes the 
causal presence of the First Cause in this teaching on primary and secondary 
causality. 18 
17 On the notion of actuality in Plotinus and the Plotiniana Arabica with particular refe-
rence to Enneads 6.8, see Richard C. Taylor, ,Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the 
Metaphysics of Being and Actuality", in: journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998), 217-239, 
particularly 234-238. 
18 Even the contingent actions on the part of things of the sublunar realm which are not 
necessitated are nevertheless traced to the First Cause as primary cause regardless of what 
contingent alternative action comes about. In this sense primary causality need not be 
understood to undermine free choice and moral responsibility for human beings. 
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2. fa'ala (agere) and abda'a (creare) in the LDC 
Throughout the LDC forms of fa'ala (to act: intransitive; to effect: transitive) , 
fa'ala fz (to act on) and infa'ala (to be acted on: chapter 1 only) are found 
corresponding to forms of the Greek poiein, paschein, and energein I energeia.19 
The term fii'il (agent) occurs a number of times and is used in chapter 19 to 
denote the First Cause as a true agent (fii'ilun l}aqqun) because it acts 
immediately in virtue of its own being (bi-annfyati-hi), without there being any 
intermediary (waslatun) or addition (ziyiidatan) between it and its effect. Propo-
sition 122 of Proclus -on which chapter 19 is based- concerns governance, scil. 
providence, on the part of divine beings, the gods. The author of the LDC trans-
forms it into an account of the governance of the First Cause and writes, ,The 
First Cause governs over all originated things ( al-ashyii'a al-mubtada 'ta kulla-hii: 
note the form from the root b-d- ') without mixing with them." He later adds, 
, [T]he First Cause is eternally stable and subsistent in its pure unity and governs 
over all originated things [ ... ] For the First Good emanates goodnesses on all 
things in a single emanation, except that every one of the things receives of that 
emanation in accordance with its power and its being ( annfyati-hi). The First 
Good emanates goodnesses on all things in a single manner because it is 
goodness - through its being, its entity and its power (bi-annfyati-hi wa-
huwfyati-hi wa-quwati-hi) -only inasmuch as it is goodness, and goodness and 
entity ( al-huwryah ro are a single thing. "21 
The author draws on Proclus but then goes on to provide his own account 
of the issue of true action and primary causality in a summary after the lines 
directly dependent on Proclus. 22 There the author introduces a notion of 
19 See Taylor, The Liber de causis, 342-3. 
20 In the LDC there is no clear distinction between huwryah/ens/entity and annryah/ esse/ 
being. 
2 1 LDC 19. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 221-223; English 315 (revised). 
22 In the final half of the chapter, the author follows Proclus only in the first two 
sentences. ,We resume and say, then, that for every agent which acts solely through its being 
there is no intermediary and no other thing intermediate between it and its effect. What is 
intermediary between the agent and the effect is only an addition to the being: I mean that, 
when the agent acts through an instrument, it does not act through its being and its being is compo-
site. So for that reason the recipient <in that case> receives through a intermediary between it and 
its agent; and the agent is then distinct from its act and does not govern with authentic and 
pervasive governance. As for the agent which is such that between it and its act there is no 
intermediary at all, the agent <here> is a true agent and a true governor which effects things w ith 
the utmost of thoroughness beyond which there can be no other thoroughness <of greater degree> 
and which governs its act with the utmost of governance. For it governs over the thing in the 
manner in which it acts, and it acts only through its entity, so <through> its entity it also gov erns 
it. Due to that it has come to govern and to act with the utmost of precision and governance in 
which there is no variation and no deviation. And the acts and governance on the part of the first 
causes are variegated only according to the merit of the recipient." Emphasis added to indicate 
what is not from Proclus. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 221-222; English, 315 (revised). 
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thoroughly pervasive governance to the utmost degree implying that this 
penetrates through all things. That this governance takes place without instru-
ment and immediately in virtue of the being of the First Cause makes this agent 
a true agent that by the very act of its being is ,a true agent and a true governor 
which effects (yafalu, makes, brings about) things with the utmost of 
thoroughness beyond which there can be no other thoroughness <of greater 
degree> and which directs its act with the utmost of governance." Like primary 
causality, through its one and only act which is not distinct from its being the 
First Cause's governing action penetrates to all things, while any governance or 
providential action involving an instrument is one in which the agent is distinct 
from its act and unable to exercise authentic ( $:Z/:ffl):m) governance. 
This notion of true agency on the part of the First Cause also appears in the 
PA numerous times. For example, in the Theology of Aristotle we find, ,The 
intellect[ ... ] is the first act of the One True Agent". 23 In the Sayings of the Greek 
Wiseman the author writes that the First Agent is also the cause of the entity 
(huwryah) of soul through the mediation of the intelligence. Furthermore, the 
First does not act through a form of its own, for in the PA and in chapter 8 (8/9) 
of the LDC the First is said to be without form (~rah, /Jilyah) and to be ,only 
being", (annfyah faqaf} 24 Similar to what is found in LDC 19, in the Sayings of 
the Greek Wiseman we find that ,The First Agent is a complete (tiimmatun) 
cause, for it is the cause of the entity (huwfyah) and form ( $Urah) of the thing 
without intermediary." Here the intelligence is said to be a cause of things below 
it but ,it is not a complete cause of the thing because it is only the cause of the 
thing's form, not the cause of entity."25 As Peter Adamson notes, in the Sayings 
of the Greek Wiseman the notion of will ( al-iriidah) on the part of the First 
Cause is rejected because it would not then act in virtue of its own being (bi-
annfyati-hi), while the first effect, the intellect, acts through knowing which is a 
condition for willing. Rather, ,will does not precede the act of the First Agent 
23 PA Theology of Aristotle, ed. Badawi, 95.16-17; Lewis tr., 469 n. 27. See Adamson, The 
Arabic Plotinus, 191-192; and Peter Adamson,Al-Kindi, Oxford, 2007,57-62. 
24 PA Sayings, ed. Badawi, 185.12-13; Lewis tr., 281, n. 14. This language is also in the 
Proclus Arabus texts edited by Gerhard Endress in Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der 
Institutio Theologica in arabischer Ubersetzung, Wiesbaden 1973, with the First Cause called 
,only being" (ann"iyah faqatJ and ,only entity" (huwryah faqat) as free of qualities and attribu-
tes and is said to produce all things as First Agent. Proclus Arabus, 72.4-9. At Proclus Arabus, 
21.30-38 we find, "If this is as we have mentioned, then it has been proven correct that there 
things are which are not material but rather only forms, and that there another thing is which 
has no matter and no form atall, but rather is only entity (huwryah faqat). This is the True 
One above whom there is nothing else and who is the Cause of causes. It has been made plain 
also by what we mentioned that the things are divided into three divisions. For either the 
thing is matter with form, so that its being is formal and material; or the thing is a form only, 
so that its being is formal, not material; or the thing is being only, so that its being is neither 
material nor formal. This <latter> is the First Cause above whom there is no other cause, as 
we have said and made evident above." Emphasis added. My translation. 
25 PA Sayings, Badawi, 185.4-19, Lewis tr., 281, nn. 105-111. My translations here. 
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because (the First Agent) acts by its being alone (bi-anni-hi faqat) ."26 The text in 
the Sayings of the Greek Wiseman then goes on to stress that the First Agent 
does not wish (lam yaridu) the origination of intellect such that it comes about 
after an act of will ( al-iradah) because there was no willing ( al-iriidah) preceding 
its act. Rather, it would be a sign of deficiency for there to be will ( al-iradah) 
between it and its product (baina-hu wa baina mafuli-hi) since it doe not go 
from one action to another but instead ,originates things all at once (ibtada'a-hii 
dafatan wahidatan). "27 It is above substance, intellect and sight, yet in its 
complete unity ,it sees and knows its own essence ( dhata-hu) which is the es-
sence above all essences" and it is itself ,the knowledge above every knowledge 
because it is the First Knowledge" and not like the knowledge that is in some s e-
cond that needs knowledge of a first substance before it. A similar description of 
the First is also found in LDC 8 where the First Cause is said to be ,above 
intelligence, soul and nature because it is the Originator of all things." There 
Divine Knowledge ( al- 'ilm al-iliihfy) is attributed to it and is asserted to be 
unlike that of intellect or soul because it is the Originator of every knowledge. 28 
These texts from the PA and LDC chapter 19 are clearly connected in meaning 
and vocabulary. The notion that the First acts immediately in virtue of its very 
being, a key principle of Neoplatonism,29 is found in each and it is this which 
distinguishes the First from the intelligence according to both Arabic sources. In 
the PA the author connects these considerations with will (al-iriidah) and rejects 
will as an attribute of the First, while in LDC 19 will ( al-iradah) is not 
mentioned. In fact, will does not occur at all in the entire LDC, although a verb 
from the same root does occur in LDC chapter 22. There the author writes 
paraphrasing and modifying Prod us, Elements of Theology, Proposition 122, ,the 
things which the governance of the intelligence does not reach, the governance 
of the Originator of the intelligence (mubdi'i al- 'aqli, Latin creatoris 
intelligentiae) already reaches. For nothing whatsoever escapes His 30 governance 
26 Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 132. PA Sayings, Badawi 1955,174. 
27 PA Sayings, Badawi 1955, 174.0-175.16; Lewis tr., 321-323, ## 105-120. My translati-
ons here. 
28 Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 178-179, English 299 (revised). 
29 Detailed discussion of this profoundly important notion of causality auto to einai is 
beyond the parameters of this article. For a valuable discussion, see Cristina D'Ancona Costa, 
,Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First Principle", in: The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge 1996, Cambridge 
Collections online, 15. September 2011. DOl: 10.1017/CCOL0521470935.016 356-385, esp. 
365-367. D' Ancona Costa also discussed this notion in the LDC in her article, ,La doctrine 
neoplatonicienne de l'etre entre l'antiquite tardive et le moyen age. Le Liber de causis par rap-
port a ses sources," in her: Recherches sur le Liber de causis, Paris 1995, 121-153, especially 146-
153, where she argues that the LDC is influenced by the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius. If 
that is the case, it raises the question of Divine freedom in the ps.-Dionysius, an issue beyond 
the limits of this article. However, it remains that Divine freedom of will and the possibility of 
a refraining from emanative creative causality is not found in the LDC. 
30 The issue of pronoun gender in the LDC is peculiar to chapter 22 where the First 
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because He wishes (yurfdu, Latin vult) all things to attain His goodness at once 
(ma'an). For not everything yearns for the intelligence and is eager to attain it, 
while all things do yearn for the First Good and are avidly eager to attain Him. 
That no one doubts!"3 1 
The middle sentence of this quotation, ,For nothing [ ... ] at once", has no 
corresponding text in the Elements of the Theology,whilethe sentence imme-
diately preceding it and that immediately following it do have corresponding 
texts in Proclus. 32 Hence, this is a remark added by the author. Yet, if the author 
of the LDC wished to state something distinctive about divine will, there are 
more than enough opportunities for such a thing to be said directly and with the 
use of iradah (will) or other related forms. For these reasons and because it 
would contradict the teaching on the First as acting by its being alone or 
through its very being, I decline to see in the case of yur'idu - which is from the 
same triliteral root as iradah, r-w-d - a need to translate it as ,it wills' and instead 
render it as ,it wishes' to indicate that the governance of the First Cause and 
First Originator as the Good is meant at once to extend to all reality by the ac-
tion of its very being which is not distinct from its essence. Consequently, there 
is no mention or reference to divine will or divine choice of any sort in the LDC. 
In fact, on the basis of the discussion of the activity of the First Cause as taking 
place by its very being (bi-ann'iyati-hi, bi-anni-hi), the common doctrine here is 
that the existence or positing of the First Cause immediately and necessarily -
without intermediate act or temporal pause of any sort- realizes the existence or 
positing of the first caused thing, the Intellect, sometimes itself called the first 
being in the sense of first originated after the First. The First is also said in the 
PA Sayings of the Greek Wiseman to be pure cause and above both natural and 
volitional necessity of which it is the cause with the result that the emanation 
from it is above the categories of nature or will. 33 
The root b-d-' in the fourth form (causative) is found as mubdi' in the texts 
discussed immediately above and I have chosen to render it for the present as 
,originator". The eighth form (reflective or passive) occurs as well, as a participle 
for a thing originated in the passive, mubtada' or the originator in the active, 
mubtadi'. 34 These forms the Latin translator chose not unreasonably to render 
with forms of creare, to create, as indicated in the beginning of this article by my 
summary of the use of forms of creare in the LDC. In the Arabic LDC, as in the 
Cause is identified with Allah, God. This is discussed below in section 3. 
31 LDC 22. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 23 7 -38; English 319-20 (substantially 
revised). Proclus, ET 1963, 108-109. 
32 Cf. Taylor, The Liber de causis, 1981 , 238. 
33 Taylor, The Liber de causis, 365: Oxford Marsh 539 f.24vl3-25r8. The text, translated 
by Lewis (see n. 4 above) in Plotini opera II, 237, ## 62-63, is discussed in Adamson, The 
Arabic Plotinus, 147 ff. Also see Peter Adamson, ,A note on Freedom in the Circle of al-
Kindi", in: 'Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of'Abbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6-10 
july 2002, Leuven/Dudley, Mass. 2003, 199-207, especially 202 sqq. 
34 No forms from the root b-d- ' appear in the Proclus Arab us texts edited by Endress. 
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PA, these forms are used to indicate the bringing to existence of something by 
an act of the First Cause, an act deemed to be described by use of this 
terminology solely in reference to the primary causality of the First Cause. In 
the LDC at chapter 17 it is said that the First Entity (al-huwryah al-ula) which is 
the Cause of causes alone gives entity (huwryah) to all things by the mode of 
origination (ibdac). 
,We resume and say, then, that the First Entity is quiescent and is the 
Cause of causes, and if it gives all things entity, it gives it in the manner of 
origination. The first life gives life to what is below, not in the manner of 
origination, but in the manner of form (bi-nawci ${iratin). And, likewise, the 
intelligence gives knowledge and the other things to what is below it only in the 
manner of form, not in the manner of origination (bi-nawci ibdacin), because the 
manner of origination belongs to the First Cause alone. ccJs 
In light of these texts, the causality of origination in the PA and the LDC 
seems to be distinctively different from that of creation 1 -if Hasker's account is 
accepted - for the origination of reality as described here is without will and 
takes place immediately upon the positing of the First Cause without pause of 
any sort and without any action additional to the being of the First Cause. 
Hence, the teaching of the LDC can be reasonably be said to be in accord with 
that of Proclus and also Plotinus in reference to the issue of primary causality. It 
involves an emanation from higher to lower which must be immediate upon the 
assertion or existence of the cause. Certainly such causality is beyond both that 
of nature which involves motion and change and that of form and what is 
entailed by form as necessity of nature and also beyond that of necessity by 
some extrinsic compulsion. Let us call extrinsic compulsion necessity 3 and what 
follows on the basis of the nature or form of a thing necessity2 .• Yet, insofar as it 
involves the immediate positing of the effect upon the positing of the cause, this 
too is a kind of necessity albeit surely of another sort, so let us call it necessity 1 
or transcendent necessity. This latter necessity1 is beyond the nature of will 
where will might denote deliberation, choice, or weighing of alternatives, 
characteristics of human will and action. It then does not involve a selection 
between alternatives with respect to the emanation of goodness since there is no 
will and no deliberation. Rather, reality under necessity 1 involves what cannot be 
otherwise than the overflowing of reality from the First as the Good. 36 This 
form of origination or ibdac ( creatio) then, does not allow for the possibility of a 
stopping or denial of the emanation of reality from the First. What is more, 
since the First Cause has no form it does not act through the necessity of a natu-
35Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 215-216; English 312 (revised). 
36 At the end of LDC 8 the author writes, ,If someone says that it has to have a form 
( IJilyah), then we say that its form ( l}ilyah) is infinite and its individual nature is the Pure Good 
emanating all goodnesses upon the intellect and upon the rest of the things through the media-
tion of the intellect." Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 189, English 300 (revised). Since form 
involves delimitation the notion of an infinite form is oxymoronic and intentionally so. 
130 
Primary Causality and ibdii' (ere are) in the Liber de causis 
re or form but only through its very self, its very being, its very goodness which 
are one. To this extent, then, it does not fit under Hasker's conception of creati-
on,, which he characterizes as ,common to the monotheistic religions of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam [ ... ] a free act on God's part; he has no ,need' to 
create but has done so out of love and generosity. "37 If we are to allow this noti-
on of ibda' (creatio) -up to this point called ,origination' in this article - to be 
called creation, let us call it for the present creation2 as emanative origination and 
let it be specified that it entails the negation of will, choice, the necessity of natu-
re characteristic of things having nature or form (which is necessity2), and also 
external compulsion (which is necessity3). The act that follows immediately 
upon the being of the First is the emanation of all reality from it as the Good. 
This emanative causality founded on the First as the Good is common to Ploti-
nus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna. For each of these it 
involves the causing by the primary cause of the existence of something after 
nothing as well as a continuous ontological activity of causing upon which all 
reality after itself depends. 38 
Philosophical support for the view that creation2 is suitably considered crea-
tion tout court can be found in the early writings of a sophisticated reader of the 
LDC, Thomas Aquinas. In his first major work, the Commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), at Book 2 d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp. Aquinas 
writes that: 
37 See note 5 above. 
38 Detailed consideration of al-Farabi and Avicenna on this issue as well as careful 
consideration of the thought of al-Kindi are beyond the parameters of the present article. I 
intend to prepare another study of these issues in their thought on another occasion. 
Regarding al-Farabi, see the first two chapters of his On the Perfect State, ed. & tr. Richard 
Walzer, Oxford 1985; rpt Chicago 1998. For Avicenna, see The Metaphysics of the Healing, tr. 
Michael E. Marmura, Provo, Utah 2005, Book 9, Ch. 6, notably 339, Arabic lines 8-12. Also see 
the account of Olga Lizzini in her Fluxus (fayd}. Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica e della 
fisica di Avicenna, Bari 2011, 300-315, and her discussion of the Theology of Aristotle from the 
PA, LDC, al-Kindi and al-Farabi as predecessors and sources for Avicenna at 27-69. Although 
al-Kindi in his treatise on the True A gent sets out a clear account of primary causality in accord 
with Ch. 1 of the LDC, his understanding of Divine creation as willed and as creation in time 
separates him from the others listed above. See Adamson, al-Kindi, 46-105, especially 57-71. 
But also see Cristina D' Ancona Costa, ,Al-Kindi et !'auteur du Liber de causis", in: Recherches 
sur le Liber de causis, 155-194. The account of divine causality and ontological dependence in 
Averroes, another major thinker of the Arabic tradition, is quite different and is something I 
will address elsewhere. Also see Cristina D'Ancona Costa's ,Avicenna and the Liber de causis: 
A contribution to the dossier", in: Revista Espanola de Filosiofia Medievale 7 (2000) 95-114. 
Here I add regarding Avicenna to note that at he seems to be discussing the PA, al-Kindi and 
perhaps the LDC at Metaphysics 6.2 (Marmura, 203-205) where he provides a definition of 
ibdii' and also at Metphysics 9.4 (Marmura, 330-331) where he reasons that ibdii' should not be 
restricted to the creative causality of the First Cause alone but rather suitably characterizes the 
causality in the emanation of intelligences as each of the higher among these causes the 
existence of its immediately lower intelligence by metaphysical agent causality (cf. Metaphysics 
6.1, Marmura, 194-195). 
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,the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes 
nothing in the thing which is said to be created [ ... ] creation is said to be from 
nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation as uncreated. The se-
cond is that in the thing which is said to be created non-being is prior to being, 
not by a priority of time or duration [ ... ] but by a priority of nature in such a 
way that, if the created thing is left to itself, non-being would result. For it has 
being only from the influence of a superior cause." 
These two criteria are precisely those found in the account of primary 
causality in the LDC derived from Proclus and common to the teachings of Plo-
tinus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna. What is more, Aquinas 
goes on in the same passage to insist that this is creation and has been taught as 
such by the philosophers. He writes, 
,For those two reasons creation is said to be from nothing in two ways. 
One is such that the negation would negate the order of creation in regard to 
something preexisting implied by the preposition from (ex), so that (creation) 
would be said to be from nothing because it is not from something preexisting. 
That is with respect to the first. The other is such that the order of creation in 
regard to nothing preexisting would remain affirmed by nature so that creation 
would be said to be from nothing because the thing created naturally has non-
being prior to being. If these two suffice for the notion of creation, then creation 
can be demonstrated in this way and in this way the philosophers have asserted 
creation. However, if we take a third <consideration> to be required for the 
notion of creation so that in duration the thing created has non -being before 
being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally after nothing, 
creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the 
philosophers, but is supposed by faith." 39 
Here it is clear that Aquinas in this early work with good reason rejects the 
understanding much later proposed by Hasker and clearly asserts criteria for the 
use of the term ,creation" that fit precisely what has been found here to be 
present in the LDC, the PA, and Proclus and which can also be said to be 
present in Plotinus, al-Farabi and Avicenna. It appears then that it is quite 
appropriate to consider creation to be of at least two sorts, creation2 which is ba-
sed on the notion of primary causality involving necessity 1 resulting from the 
First as the Good and creation 1 which is also based on primary causality but adds 
the Abrahamic understanding that the First creates without any sort of 
39 Thomas Aquinas, In 2 Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp., Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Ma-
gistri Petri Lombardi, Pierre Mandonnet, ed., Vol. 2, Paris 1929, 18. My translations here are 
based on a pre-publication version of the text of Aquinas provided by Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P, 
president of the Commissio Leonina, Paris . The criterion of temporal creation indicated in the 
third is shared with al-Kindi, though here Aquinas considers it something known only through 
Christian faith. Aquinas also holds that creation is free and not necessitated. Detailed discuss i-
on of his views in relation to his other writings and in relation to the views set out in this 
article will have to await another occasion. 
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necessity, need not have created at all, and acts by will, in some understanding of 
that term. 40 
3. A Possible Objection: LDC 22 (Latin 22/23) 
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the teachings in the LDC are not 
properly described as those of creation 1 as understood in the religions of the 
Abrahamic traditions since the freedom not to originate or not to create is not 
present in the LDC. Rather, the doctrine set out in the LDC is that of creation2, 
namely, of emanation in the context of a clear understanding of the nature of 
primary causality but without involving will, deliberation or choice on the part 
of the First Cause in the origination of the world. That is, the doctrine of creati-
on2 in the LDC is not a religious doctrine of creation 1 of the sort described by 
Hasker. 
However, an objection to this view might be formed on the basis of what is 
found in chapter 22 (Latin 22/23) of the LDC. There the author follows Proclus, 
Elements of Theology, proposition 134 closely albeit paraphrasing and simplifying 
as well as drawing upon phraseology found in the PA. 41 The author also draws on 
earlier reasoning from various chapters of the LDC, among them 1 for primary 
causality, 4 ( 4/5) for the identification of the first created as the intelligence, and 
8 (8/9) but particularly 19 (19/20) for governance, scil. the exercise of providen-
ce. Yet LDC 22 (22/23) is unique in the work for distinctly identifying the First 
Cause as Allah, the Deity of the Abrahamic traditions, accompanied by laudatory 
benedictions. Here is a translation of this chapter: 
,Every divine intelligence knows things inasmuch as it is an intelligence and 
governs them inasmuch as it is divine. For the special characteristic of the 
intelligence is knowing and its completeness and perfection are that it be a 
knower. But that which governs is God - may He be blessed and exalted! -
because He fills things with goodnesses. The intelligence is the first thing 
originated (mubtada') and most similar to God - may He be exalted! -, so in 
virtue of that it came to govern the things which are below it. And just as God-
40 In his late Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, Aquinas writes that God is existing 
outside the order of beings and that ,all things depend on divine will as on a first cause which 
transcends the order of necessity and contingency ( omnes dependeant a uoluntate diuina sicut a 
prima causa que transcendit ordinern necessitatis et contingencie) ." Expositio libri Peryermenias 
(Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris 1989 [Opera omnia, 1,1] 78, 452-454. My thanks to Andrea 
Robiglio for calling my attention to this passage. 
41 The PA identifies the First with the one God of the Arabic tradition with terms such as 
al-barf and al-khaliq, each Qur'anic words for Creator. It is worthy of note that each of the 
two extant Arabic manuscripts of the LDC have Allah (God) and al-ilah (the god) in different 
passages, perhaps a vestige of the original translation from Proclus. Note also that the chapter 
ends with La yashakku fz dhalika shakkun ,that no one doubts", which is nearly identical with 
PA Theology, ed. Badawi 73.7, la yashakku fz dhalika ahadun, Lewis, p.439, n.49. 
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may He be blessed and exalted! - pours forth goodness on things, so too the 
intelligence pours forth knowledge on the things below it. But, although the 
intelligence governs the things which are below it, nevertheless God- may He be 
blessed and exalted! - precedes the intelligence in governance and governs the 
things with a governance more exalted than and superior to the governance of 
the intelligence, because He is what gives <the power> to govern to the 
intelligence. 
The proof of that is that the things which the governance of the intelligence 
does not reach, the governance of the Originator (mubdi', creatoris) of the 
intelligence already reaches. For nothing whatsoever escapes His governance 
because He wishes 42 that all things attain His goodness at once. For not every 
thing yearns for the intelligence and is eager to attain it, but all things do yearn 
for the First Good and are avidly eager to attain Him: that no one doubts! "43 
In the corresponding Proposition 134 of the Elements of Theology Proclus 
reiterates the doctrine of primary causality stating that the Deity (to theion), in 
this case referring to the One, the Good, extends its influence beyond the reach 
of intelligence, something clearly expressed in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph above. Yet that formulaic benedictions characteristic of the 
Abrahamic traditions occur in this chapter of the LDC gives some reason for the 
belief that for the author God as mentioned here is the Deity of the Abrahamic 
traditions. Further, God - here called ,the Originator" ( mubdi', creatoris) and al-
so the First Good - is the First Cause of all mentioned throughout the LDC. 
On the basis of the evidence of the LDC, the author himself indeed seems to 
have made precisely this identification and as well to have held that there is no 
distinction between creation1 and creation2• Precisely how the author of the 
LDC would have dealt with the issue of divine will and free creation or even 
whether it would have been a concern to him has to remain an unknown matter 
of speculation since, as pointed out earlier, the vocabulary of will (iriidah and 
related terms) does not appear in the LDC. On the basis of the texts we have it 
is apparent that the author identified Neoplatonic causality auto to einai o r 
causality bi-annlyati-hi, that is, causality in virtue of its very being, as 
characteristic of the True One, the Originator/Creator, the First Cause, the 
Good, God, since no activity can be added to its essence without introducing 
plurality into what is asserted to be pure Unity. Perhaps this should be of no 
surprise since the same issue is found in the thought of Avicenna for whom the 
First Cause acts not by necessity of nature or external or internal constraint of 
the sort found below the First and associated with what has form, nor by choice, 
deliberation or will, but as the Good, 44 which was also taught by Plotinus. 
42 Note that earlier in section 2 I set aside the possibility that yuridu here is used to 
indicate willing. 
43 Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 235-238; English 319-320 (revised). 
44 See the account of Lizzini in her Fluxus (fayt;/). Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica 
e della fisica di Avicenna cited in note 34. 
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4. Conclusion 
In section 1 I considered the opening chapter of the LDC with its sources in 
Proclus providing the translations of Dodds for the latter and providing my own 
translation of the Arabic of LDC chapter 1. My purpose was to establish that 
chapter 1 of the LDC is fully devoted to setting forth an account of primary and 
secondary causality whereby the causal presence of the First Cause as primary 
cause is argued to be more causally present to any effect than is any other cause 
intermediate between those two. For the author of the LDC this is the 
foundation for the argument that the First Cause originates or creates while all 
other causes act by form and provide form. Hence, the reasoning of primary 
causality explicates the view that there is but one First Cause or God and that 
the origination or creation of being is characteristic only of the First. 
In section 2 I examined the uses of forms of the terms fa'ala (agere, to act) 
and abda'a (creare, to originate, to create) showing similarities of language and 
doctrine in the LDC and the PA. Of particular importance is the presence of the 
Neoplatonic notion of a thing acting by its very being and not by an act added to 
its being. The author of the LDC adopted this notion from Proclus and in all 
likelihood from the PA to argue that this sort of causality bi-annfyati-hi or in 
virtue of its very being belongs only to the First Cause. In the PA this notion is 
associated with the view of the First as above will, choice and decision and not 
necessitated in its actions by any internal necessity (necessity2) based on its na-
ture or form or by any external necessity or compulsion (necessity3). However, 
insofar as it is the One and the Good, its emanative causality of all other realities 
is not an act additional to its essence but rather follows immediately upon its 
existence as the Good, the One, the First Cause (necessity1). After arguing that 
this activity is suitably called creation and distinguishing it as creation2 in 
contrast to creation 1 where this latter is a religious notion involving Divine free 
will, I cited the early work of Thomas Aquinas in support of determining each of 
these to be suitably called creation and rejected Hasker's view that emanative 
origination should not be called creation. The foundation for this is the explana-
tion of primary causality which is in accord with what Aquinas found in Avicen-
na and also in the LDC, a work which in that period Aquinas attributed to Aris-
totle. 
In section 3 I weighed whether the use of Allah and of benedictions in LDC 
22 constitutes an objection to my explanation of ibda' in the LDC as creation2 
involving an emanation necessitated by the First as the Good (necessity1) since 
the use of of Allah and · of benedictions may be indicative of the Abrahamic 
religious observance and a conception of free creation or creation 1• I found in the 
LDC no evidence for a conception of free creation as creation 1 and concluded 
that for the author of the LDC the emanative origination bi-annfyati-hi, that is, 
in virtue of its very being, is understood as creation tout court. 
The introduction of Greek philosophical teachings into the Islamic milieu 
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of the Ninth century was both complicated and controversial. It was 
controversial because it involved a claim to truth about matters relating to the 
nature and structure of the world and also about the causes of the world, 
including the First Cause or God, where religious believers already had answers 
to these matters in holy scriptures. It was complicated because this meant that 
the value of philosophy had to be argued and its apparent or real contradictions 
to central religious teachings - such as the free creation of all reality by the one 
God - at least initially in the early period of the ,Circle of al-Kindi"45 posed 
possible moments of conflict and correction. bi-annfyati-hi, that is, causality in 
virtue of its very being. In the introduction to his On First Philosophy Al-Kindi 
himself argues that philosophy and in particular metaphysics is just another way 
to the truth and to the true understanding of God and His creation; hence, 
when properly understood, philosophy should be accepted along side Islamic re-
velation as another way to the same truths found in religion. 46 Al-Kindi's edition 
of the PA's Theology of Aristotle sets out the doctrine of emanative creation bi-
annryati-hi and, just as we find in the LDC, he himself adopted the doctrine of 
primary causality in his short treatise on The True Agent and presents a proof of 
divine unity in his On First Philosophy. Yet, al-Kindi embraced not an eternal 
emanative creation2 but a doctrine of temporal creation1 by a divine willing47 in 
accord with Islamic religious teaching. The teachings of the LDC on creation, 
however, remain clearly within the philosophical tradition of the 
Neoplatonism. 48 
45 See G. Endress, ,The Circle of al-Kindi. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and 
the Rise of Islamic Philosophy", in: The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. 
Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences Dedicated to H.]. Drossaart Lulofs, 
ed. Gerhard Endress and Remke Kruk, Leiden 1997, 43-76. 
46 The entire preface is dedicated to the advocacy for philosophy to be accepted in the 
context of Islam. For the text, see Oeuvres Philosophiques et Scientifiques d'al-Kindi, ed. 
Roshdi Rashed and Jean J olivet, Vol. 2, Leiden/Boston/Koln 1998, 8-17. 
47 See note 36 above. Also see Adamson, Al-Kindi, 57-62 on The True Agent, 47-57 on 
divine unity, and 98-101 on eternity and temporal creation. 
48 I am pleased to express my thanks to Cristina D'Ancona Costa, Jan Opsomer, Luis X. 
L6pez-Farjeat, Andrea Robligio and Owen Goldin taking the time to read this article and for 
offering several very valuable suggestions. 
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